Affectivity in mental disorders: an enactive-simondonian approach
Enara Garcia
University of the Basque Country, University of Grenada
Oct. 5, 2023, 10 a.m. UTC // Oct. 5, 2023, 10 a.m. in UTC
Several enactive-phenomenological perspectives have pointed to affectivity as a central aspect of mental disorders. From a phenomenological and enactive perspective, affectivity is not restricted to particular emotions, but it constitutes a structural invariant and the condition of possibility of our mental world. However, most research on enactive and situated affectivity has focused on emotions as the paradigmatic cases of affective experience, often collapsing the wide variety of affective experiences under the umbrella term "emotion." This tendency has emphasized the action-oriented character of affective experiences, often overlooking the diversity of forms that affectivity adopts, their different intentional structures, and their differential role in sense-making (e.g., atmospheres, moods, existential feelings). These phenomenological and structural differences are relevant if we aim to provide a phenomenologically-informed enactive account of mental disorders.
In this work, I develop an enactive framework to describe mental disorders as disorders of affectivity. For doing so, I resort to Simondon's (1958/2020) philosophy of individuation and phenomenological distinctions of affectivity (Fuchs, 2013) to adopt a genetic perspective on affectivity, sense-making, and mental disorders.
