The aim of my presentation is twofold. Firstly, I will present my recent research on an important but often overlooked ethical phenomenon that, I argue, is powerfully elucidated by means of enactive resources. Secondly, and more tentatively, I discuss how this research informs my new research project on enactivism, technology and human well-being.
The ethical phenomenon with which I begin my presentation concerns ‘the paradox of moral perception,’ as I’ve termed it. This ethical phenomenon, to be clear, does not refer to a logical but to a phenomenological-practical paradoxicality. Specifically, I have in mind the seemingly contradictory phenomenon that perceiving other people as moral subjects is at once incredibly easy and incredibly difficult; it is something we do nearly effortlessly and successfully all the time without giving it much thought and it is something that often requires effort and that we fail at all the time (also often without giving it much thought). I argue that enactivism offers powerful resources for explaining the paradoxical nature of moral perception. These resources, moreover, bring out two important dimensions of ethical life that are frequently overlooked in contemporary ethical theory: namely the embodied and socio-technical environment-embedded dimensions of moral perception and moral visibility. As I make my argument, I connect enactivism with insights from David Hume’s and Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy as well as insights from the field of Epistemic Injustice. As such, I situate enactivism within the larger theoretical ethical landscape; showing connections with existing ethical theories and identifying some of the ways in which enactivism offers unique contributions to our understanding of ethical life. Having discussed this recent research, I conclude the paper by discussion tentative additional enactive contributions to our understanding of ethical life that I aim to research in my new research project.
Link to join/watch the seminar: https://youtu.be/M7p5SBhbQCU
Enactivism and the Paradox of Moral Perception (van Grunsven)