Oct. 8, 2015, 2 p.m. UTC // Oct. 8, 2015, 10 a.m. in America/New_York
One of the implications of enactive thinking is that dimensions commonly used to distinguish and articulate differences in experience are questioned, and adopted only in altered form, if at all. Simple distinctions between perceptual modalities, for instance, cannot be casually made from an enactive standpoint (or at least, should not). To more clearly consider this difference of approach, I will outline two ways of thinking about structure. The first is componential, in which structure arises through the combination (addition, subtraction, or substitution) of components. The second is emergent, in which structure arises through differentiation and association of existing materials. I will use this distinction to try to elucidate some of the implications of the holistic perspective inherent in enactive thinking. In particular, I will examine what I see as aspects of enactive thinking that could benefit from insights from ecological psychology (as derived from Gibson, particularly following the thought of Edward Reed and Tony Chemero). I will attempt to outline the usefulness of being more aware and explicit of the ecological dimensions of experience and behaviour, and show how this more ecologically explicit thinking can enable the formulation of interesting questions concerning individuality.